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What is a mechanism? 
The idea of mechanisms, and how they are used in the sciences, is something that has been 
explored since 1993 in what is often regarded as the core mechanisms literature, focusing on 
the life sciences and the sciences of mind and brain (Bechtel & Richardson 1993; Glennan 
1996; Machamer, Darden and Craver (MDC) 2000), and since 1983 in philosophy of social 
sciences (Elster 1983, Hedström & Swedberg 1998). 
Probably the most well-known current characterization of a mechanism is: “Mechanisms are 
entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or 
set-up to finish or termination conditions.” (Machamer et al., 2000: 3.)  The paradigm 
mechanism that MDC discuss is that of protein synthesis, which explains how cells make 
proteins.  For this case, they say, entities include “the cell membrane, vesicles, microtubules, 
molecules, and ions,” and activities include, “biosynthesis, transport, depolarization, 
insertion, storage, recycling, priming, diffusion, and modulation.” (Machamer et al., 2000: 8.)  
There have been various alternative characterizations (Glennan 2002; Bechtel & Abrahamsen 
2005), and Illari and Williamson offered the following simplified account: “A mechanism for 
a phenomenon consists of entities and activities organized in such a way that they are 
responsible for the phenomenon.” (2012: 120.)  Illari and Williamson argue that this captures 
an emerging consensus within the mechanisms literature, and show how the account can be 
interpreted fairly broadly to avoid excluding key mechanisms (compare the closely similar 
formulations of Craver 2007, and Glennan 2008, 2009). 
Simply put, then, finding a mechanism explains a phenomenon by finding local parts, and 
discovering what they do and how they are organized to produce the phenomenon.  In 
medicine, we seek to discover mechanisms of disease and of cure.  A great deal of this work 
depends on our existing knowledge of bodily mechanisms, of which protein synthesis is an 
important example.  
What is evidence of mechanism in medicine? 
To explain disease, we seek at least some evidence of mechanisms of disease and of cure.  A 
paradigm kind of evidence of mechanism is probably use of breakthrough technologies, such 
as Franklin’s X-ray crystallography photograph of DNA, which help us study entities we 
could not study directly before and understand their activities and how they are organized.  
Franklin’s work was famously used by Watson and Crick to describe the structure of DNA, 
which is now central to our understanding of thousands of cellular mechanisms.  In general, 
finding and understanding new entities and their activities, of which bacteria and viruses may 
well be the most famous examples, has been important in the history of medicine, and no 
doubt will continue to be so. 
Finding entities might be important, but a huge variety of other scientific work might count as 
finding evidence of mechanism: anything that helps us identify or better understand entities, 
activities, and their organization, including simulating organization of complex mechanisms, 
might count as finding evidence of mechanism. (See Bechtel & Richardson 1993 and Darden 
& Craver 2013 for extensive discussion.)  It is worth noting that the literature often 
recognises two kinds of mechanisms.  The first kind is mechanisms that consist of entities 
and activities underlying a phenomenon of interest (called ‘constitutive’ by Craver 2007; and 
‘vertical’ by Kincaid 2011, 2012).  For example, we observe that cells make proteins and 
identify the activities of DNA, RNA, and ribosomes as the mechanism underlying this 
phenomenon.  The second kind is mechanisms that consist of intermediate links between a 
posited cause and its effect (called ‘etiological’ by Craver 2007; and ‘horizontal’ by Kincaid 
2011, 2012).  Taking the example of protein synthesis again, we might suspect that an 
alteration in DNA affects which proteins are produced, and try to identify the intervening 
entities and activities by which the cause leads to the effect.  This distinction in kinds of 
mechanism can be important for some purposes (see Kincaid 2011, 2012), but in some cases 
it might not much matter: if we cannot really tell what kind of mechanism we are examining 
given what we know.  Suppose we are investigating little known mechanisms of protein 
synthesis, trying to identify new entities or activities, then we might make the same 
methodological choices whether we think of ourselves as identifying a constitutive/vertical 
mechanism underlying this phenomenon, or finding an etiological/horizontal mechanism 
linking cause and effect.  It might only be possible to use this distinction in practice for cases 
where the mechanisms in question are unusually well known. 
In the face of the variety of kinds of evidence of mechanism, I will simplify this short piece 
by focusing on a single case: that of breast cancer.  This case is unusual, in that evidence of 
mechanism is used very intensively, but, for this reason, it serves well to illustrate the points, 
so that they can be applied to thinking about less clear cases. 
Although the breast cancer population is large, it is non-homogenous. Not all breast cancers 
develop in the same way, or respond to treatment in the same way.  There is no single 
mechanism of disease.  There are important differences among cancerous cells, differences 
among tumors as to how they develop and grow, and, as is common, differences in individual 
patient positive response to treatment versus toleration of toxicity.  These differences are 
crucial to our understanding of the disease, to understanding that there are multiple related 
mechanisms of breast cancer, with different prognoses. 
We can now get effective evidence of these different mechanisms at the cellular level, even in 
individual patients.  Most notably, we can take biopsies and type breast cancer cells 
according to the proteins expressed on their surfaces.  This has been enormously helpful in 
understanding possible mechanisms of cure (or inhibition). Designing drugs that target 
particular proteins has led to enormously improved treatment in 80-85% of cases of breast 
cancer, because it helps to get drugs to harm cancerous cells and not healthy cells.  The 
protein targets become a crucial access point for an effective mechanism of cure. 
The other side of this success story is the remaining 15-20% of cases, called ‘triple negative 
breast cancer’ (TNBC).  Clinically, “[t]riple--negative breast cancers are defined as tumors 
that lack expression of estrogen receptor …, progesterone receptor …, and HER2.” (Foulkes 
et al.: 1938.)  Although TNBC is more common in younger women, it has a poor prognosis, 
as we have no drugs that will effectively target it.  The search to better understand these 
mechanisms of disease, and design effective mechanisms of cure, will continue.  Improving 
treatment of breast cancer is dependent on this ongoing, extensive, largely laboratory-based, 
determination of mechanism. 
Integrating evidence of mechanism with other evidence in medicine 
Explaining disease is of course intellectually valuable, but it is not the only aim of medicine. 
As in breast cancer, in wider medicine we want to act.  In this section, I will draw attention to 
the many things we want to know in medicine in order to act effectively, and begin to 
illustrate how this leads us to use evidence of mechanism alongside other evidence, most 
notably randomized controlled trials (RCTs, see chapter 19). 
In medicine, we want to know what causes disease, certainly, but this is not simple, nor is it 
the only task (see interesting details in Dawid 2000; Kincaid 2011, 2012).  Notice that we 
also want to know how we can treat people, to prevent disease or cause cure, which is not 
quite the same as knowing what causes disease.  Further, we frequently want to know how a 
particular agent causes a disease, or how a drug works, which is often explicitly described as 
finding the mechanism of disease causation, or of cure. 
We also want to know other things, which may be more or less important under varying 
circumstances.  In many cases, quantities matter.  For example, we need to know effective 
dosage of drugs, or what levels of radiation are safe.  We also want to know various things 
about the human population we intend to treat.  Are some people more at risk?  For example, 
some drugs must not be given to pregnant women.  Ultimately, patients and their doctors 
have to assess what is the best treatment for one particular person. 
Mechanisms are directly involved in explaining how disease is caused, but knowledge of 
mechanisms can also help with these other tasks.  To succeed in these tasks, we use evidence 
of mechanism alongside other sources of evidence.  Many philosophers have advocated 
something like a requirement of ‘total evidence’ (Carnap 1962; Hempel 1965) in science 
more broadly.  This requires us to bring to bear all available evidence on scientific problems, 
and acknowledge that, in science, any study is fallible. All studies have some weaknesses. 
This means that the best we can do in investigating any particular disease, or possible 
treatment, is use a variety of kinds of studies, kinds of experimental work, and different 
sources of evidence.  We hope that, at the very least, they have different kinds of weaknesses, 
and should not all display the same bias.  When this is true, and a variety of different studies 
agree, we can have much more confidence in the outcome (Haack 1993; Wimsatt 2007). 
This requirement of total evidence does not seem to accord with privileging a single kind of 
tool or study.  Randomized controlled trials (see chapter 19), where the study population is 
randomized to treatment and control groups, are often treated as our ‘gold standard’ of 
medical evidence (Cartwright & Munro 2010).  RCTs are rightly valued for careful protocols, 
which, if carefully followed, restrict the influence of bias and unknown confounders on the 
outcome, both accidental (perhaps due to doctors and patients having faith in the new 
treatment), and non-accidental (such as fraud).  RCTs are an important tool, although, for 
practical or ethical reasons, they cannot be used in many cases. 
Important tool that they are, as we noted above, RCTs, like any evidence, should not be used 
alone.  And indeed they are not.  Whether running an RCT (or indeed an observational 
study), you have to make a variety of decisions that cannot themselves be decided by an 
observational or experimental clinical study.  You have to decide what variables you will 
include in your study and how you will measure them – many medical studies depend heavily 
on decisions about diagnosis of disease, and judgment of cure or of disease progression.  You 
have to decide how long to run a trial for: 12 weeks, 6 months, or 5 years?  When these 
questions are raised, they are often treated as either simply part of the RCT, or as based 
merely on ‘preclinical trials’ or on ‘background knowledge.’  But we can do better than this – 
we can recognize that justified choices of these kinds can be based on our best evidence for 
the mechanism of disease causation, and possible mechanism of cure.  That understanding 
should inform diagnosis, judgment of cure or disease progression, and decisions about how 
long patients need to be followed up for.  
To illustrate, these kinds of decisions had to be made to run a Phase 2 trial of iniparib as an 
initially promising treatment for TNBC.  Diagnosis of disease was performed by typing cells 
from biopsies, but judgment of successful treatment was difficult for this trial.  Sadly, 
unambiguous complete cure was not expected, which meant the trial designers had to define 
what they would count as relevant outcomes.  The authors explain: “Primary end points were 
the rate of clinical benefit (defined as the percentage of patients who had a complete 
response, a partial response, or stable disease for at least 6 months), as well as safety and 
tolerability of iniparib. Secondary end points were the overall rate of response and 
progression-free survival, defined as the time from randomization to confirmation of disease 
progression or death. Overall survival (defined as the time from randomization until the date 
of death) was not prespecified as an end point but was analyzed to explore the potential effect 
of iniparib on survival.” (O’Shaugnessy et al., 2011: 207.)  The study required, of course, a 
way of assessing progression-free survival: “Tumor response was based on investigator 
assessment of target and nontarget lesions and was assessed by means of computed 
tomography or magnetic resonance imaging at baseline and every 6 weeks thereafter, in the 
absence of clinically evident disease progression.” (O’Shaugnessy et al. 2011: 207.)  The 
variety of outcomes specified was based on our knowledge of the usual mechanisms of 
disease progression, and what could reasonably be hoped for from the treatment being tested. 
Further, the trial used what technologies it could to track the underlying mechanisms of 
disease progression, such as the growth of the tumor, by examining the tumor using 
computed tomography or magnetic resonance imaging to give an assessment of patient 
response that was as objective as possible.  Evidence of mechanism of disease progression 
was used here on an individual patient basis. 
Evidence of mechanism can also be very helpful for an important group of tasks once trials 
have been completed: extending the results of studies to non-study populations.  This can 
include wider patient populations, overseas populations, important sub-populations, or even 
decisions about one single case.  An observational study or even RCT does not in itself 
contain information about who else the results of that study might – or might not – apply to.  
(Steel 2007 discusses the ‘extrapolator’s circle’; Cartwright 2012 presses the worry of 
‘external validity’, see chapter **.)  Evidence of mechanism cannot solve these problems 
entirely, but it can help us make judgments. 
For example, in the case of breast cancer, evidence of mechanism tells us how crucial the 
cellular differences are to treating sub-populations of cases.  This lets us know that typing the 
cells from a biopsy is likely to be more important to whether a patient will respond to a 
treatment designed to target that particular protein than whether a patient lives in the UK or 
the US. Of course, this does not exclude other differences being relevant to patient response. 
In sum, there are multiple tasks in assessing disease causation in medicine, and in choosing 
sensible treatments.  Evidence of mechanism is frequently helpful.  In general, it is not 
possible to make really justified choices for all of these vital decisions without investigating 
what evidence there may be of mechanism of disease causation or cure.   
Assessing evidence of mechanism 
All these tasks are involved when putting together kinds of evidence to decide, overall, what 
to conclude on the basis of multiple studies about any possible treatment, which is the 
responsibility of many public bodies worldwide.  For example, in the US, the Food and Drug 
Administration is the agency responsible for assessing drugs for safety and efficacy to decide 
whether their sale should be permitted in the US.  The National Institute for Care and Health 
Excellence in the UK is responsible for assessing treatments for effectiveness versus cost, to 
say which treatments will be paid for by the UK National Health Service (see National 
Institute for Care and Health Excellence 2014).  The International Agency for Research on 
Cancer is tasked with categorizing carcinogens (see International Agency for Research on 
Cancer 2006).  These and many other agencies convene panels or committees to assess all the 
evidence available on particular medical treatments. 
Knowledge of mechanisms can help us perform this kind of assessment. But we do not 
simply either know a complete mechanism, or know nothing whatsoever about the 
mechanism.  We need to assess in a more nuanced way than this what kind of evidence of 
mechanism we have.  In this section I will illustrate how we can have different amounts of 
evidence of mechanism by describing three different ‘levels’ of evidence of mechanism one 
might have.   I draw heavily on collaborative work with Brendan Clarke, Donald Gillies, 
Federica Russo and Jon Williamson (summarized in Clarke et al. 2014).  
The main point is that evidence of mechanism must amount to more than a hypothesis about a 
possible mechanism, but need not amount to complete knowledge of a mechanism.  Suppose 
you are on an evidence panel assessing whether a particular drug (Drug) causes a cure (Cure) 
of a particular disease. Consider that there are at least three different levels of evidence of 
mechanism you might have: 
1. Evidence that there is a particular mechanism explaining a link between Drug and Cure. 
2. Evidence that there is some kind of mechanism or other explaining a link between Drug 
and Cure. 
3. Evidence that there is no mechanism explaining a putative link between Drug and Cure. 
We are very seldom in the position where we know the complete mechanism in medicine.  
However, all three levels above are feasible, and they can all be incredibly useful.  
In reverse order, homeopathy is often considered a case of level 3.  Ultimately our major 
reason for considering homeopathy ineffective is that everything that we understand of the 
physical chemistry of water suggests that homeopathy’s posited mechanism of action cannot 
work; that water does not have a ‘memory’ in the relevant sense.  Notice that this evidence is 
not narrowly of the posited mechanism, but is much broader, as the physical chemistry of 
water structures what we know about many other mechanisms in the domain.  Ultimately, of 
course, this is an application of other scientific knowledge, which should not be treated as 
permanently infallible.  We cannot know how our understanding of the physical chemistry of 
water will develop in the future.  
A particularly important case of level 2 is the discovery of the mechanism of the disease 
tetanus.  Tetanus was puzzling, as the disease seemed to involve infection at a wound site, 
causing effects distant in the body.  When we discovered that the mechanism of action was 
due to a protein that travelled around the body, and isolated the protein, it was an enormous 
leap forward, even if we did not know the full mechanism.  Faced with a different puzzling 
disease, it is then sensible to ask whether there might be another mediating protein, and 
search in turn for evidence of its action. This is reasoning from analogy. Isolating that 
protein, and identifying other entities and activities in the mechanism, shifts the evidence 
from level 2 to level 1. 
Whether you require evidence of level 3, 2 or 1 is highly contextual.  It depends heavily on 
how much you know about the domain in question, and on your purposes.  In a public health 
emergency involving a largely unknown domain, a public body might regard level 3 as 
enough to proceed to trials.  When considering a very well-known domain, a drug company 
might require something closer to level 1, such as identification of a drug target in a well-
known mechanism of disease causation, and laboratory evidence that the drug is effective 
against that target, before funding expensive trials. 
Ultimately, both scientists and evidence panels put evidence of mechanism together with 
evidence from clinical trials to make decisions about treatment.  I will illustrate the use of 
evidence of mechanism through the rest of this chapter by looking in more depth at two trials 
of iniparib as a treatment for TNBC: the earlier trial seemed promising (O’Shaugnessy et al. 
2011), while a later and larger trial showed no significant benefit (O’Shaugnessy et al. 2014). 
The reason to test iniparib as a possible treatment was dependent on lab-based evidence of 
mechanism: in this case, pretty well known general mechanisms of cancer causation, 
combined with reasoning from analogy from the mechanisms successfully designed to target 
80% of cases of breast cancer, to search for a drug which may be effective on at least some 
cases of TNBC. The broad outline of cancer causation is well known.  DNA is constantly 
subject to damage, but cells have multiple DNA repair mechanisms.  The ultimate defense 
against cancer is when unrepairable cells undergo programmed cell death.  Only when this, 
too, fails, do cells begin replicating out of control, which is to say, become cancerous. 
The standard treatment used for TNBC is chemotherapy, which aims to kill cancerous cells, 
but has significant toxic effects on healthy cells.  Iniparib was designed as a possible new 
mechanism of cure, to try to increase the effectiveness of chemotherapy.  Cancerous cells 
also have to repair their own DNA to stay alive when they are under attack by treatments 
such as chemotherapy.   Iniparib inhibits PARP (poly(adenosine diphosphate–ribose) 
polymerase), and inhibiting PARP was found to increase the frequency of double-strand 
breaks in DNA (Carey and Sharpless 2011: 277).  TNBC cells were thought to be particularly 
susceptible to double-strand breaks killing them (O’Shaugnessy et al. 2011: 205).  Finally, 
lab evidence suggested that iniparib would work well with chemotherapy drugs: “Although 
the full mechanism of its antitumor activity is still under investigation, iniparib enhances the 
antiproliferative and cytotoxic effects of …[chemotherapy drugs] in in vitro models of triple-
negative breast cancer.” (O’Shaugnessy et al. 2011: 206.) 
What was hypothesized here was a way to interrupt a known mechanism of disease causation 
(level 1), piggybacking on known mechanisms of cure (level 2-1), using a new substance, 
iniparib, the action of which had been confirmed in lab-based preclinical trials (level 2).  Put 
simply, available evidence and reasoning about mechanism were used to design iniparib to 
set up the cancerous cells so that the chemotherapy would wipe them out – making the 
chemotherapy far more toxic to cancerous cells than to healthy cells. 
This illustrates, then, how useful evidence of mechanism can be, in this case for the task of 
continuing the search for treatments of a disease that currently has a very poor prognosis.  It 
also illustrates how evidence of a solitary mechanism is not generally used in an isolated way, 
but integrated with other availably mechanistic knowledge.  In the final section, we will turn 
to examining problems of evidence of mechanism, and looking more carefully at how 
evidence of mechanism is put together with evidence generated by clinical trials.  Iniparib 
will also be used to illustrate this – promising as it seems, as of 2014, iniparib does not work 
in clinical trials. 
Problems with evidence of mechanism 
So far in this chapter we have seen how mechanisms are used to explain disease, and 
developed thinking about how evidence of mechanism can be useful for many of the different 
tasks of medicine.  In this final section, I will sound a note of caution.  Some might be 
tempted to regard evidence of mechanism as conclusive about whether, say, Drug causes 
Cure.  However, evidence of mechanism is itself fallible (see Howick 2011).  In this section I 
will examine two common problems with evidence of mechanism, and argue that evidence of 
mechanism is best used in integration with other sorts of evidence, such as that coming from 
clinical studies such as RCTs. 
Recall that I claimed in the previous section that we seldom if ever have complete knowledge 
of a mechanism.  The three levels of evidence I have described and defended as useful are all 
levels of less than complete knowledge.  It is in this, the usual context, where two common 
problems of evidence of mechanism arise.  Again, suppose we are assessing whether Drug 
causes Cure. 
1. Complexity: The mechanism explaining the link between Drug and Cure is too complex 
to allow us to estimate an overall, average effect. 
2. Masking: The mechanism explaining the link between Drug and Cure is masked by an 
undiscovered mechanism which also links Drug and Cure.  The undiscovered mechanism 
may have the opposite effect to the known mechanism. 
Suppose you have level 1 evidence of a mechanism that explains a link between Drug and 
Cure.  Perhaps you have isolated some crucial entities on the pathway from Drug to Cure, 
and established novel activities that explain the action of Drug.  It can be tempting to suppose 
that you can now be certain that Drug causes Cure. 
Notice, however, what you most want to know given the task of medicine: you want to know 
that the drug will work to cure disease in real human populations.  Real populations, the 
human body, and even individual cells, are very complex, interactive entities.  This means 
that identifying one mechanism connecting Drug and Cure does not tell you what else might 
connect or otherwise affect Drug and Cure.  You might have a problem of complexity, which 
means that you have pretty secure lab-based or even in vivo evidence of mechanism, but are 
unable to estimate effect size attributable to that mechanism, perhaps even be unable to 
decide whether its overall effect will be positive or negative.  Further, you might have a 
masking problem: however detailed your knowledge of the known mechanism is, other 
mechanisms may exist connecting Drug and Cure, that are completely unknown to you, and 
mask (or alternatively enhance) the action of the known mechanism. 
To address these problems, to help decide what will work in real human populations, what we 
need clinical studies.  These studies cannot entirely solve the problems at hand, but they can 
be very helpful.  On the one hand, if they are also positive, we have excellent evidence for the 
effectiveness of Drug.  On the other hand, it is quite common for a new treatment that 
appears promising in the lab or in animal studies to turn out ineffective in human populations 
– due perhaps to toxicity, but also sometimes due to not working, for no reason that we can 
detect. 
I will illustrate the importance of using trials alongside evidence of mechanism by examining 
how work on iniparib proceeded at the trial stage.  The later 2014 trial concludes: “The 
efﬁcacy results from the phase III study did not conﬁrm the promising results of the phase II 
[2011] study.” (O’Shaughnessy et al. 2014: 3846.)  So the first thing to note is that however 
good the lab studies of iniparib looked, the phase 3 trial did not support its effectiveness in a 
real human population. 
I will now suggest that evidence integration goes beyond simple ideas of weighing evidence. 
It is not the case that positive preclinical evidence is a plus, while negative RCTs or other 
trial evidence is a minus, and we generate the overall assessment of evidence by simply 
adding up the pluses and subtracting the minuses.  In the case of iniparib, the negative Phase 
3 trial trumps the positive lab evidence for decisions about treatment, while the lab evidence 
remains strong enough to support further lab work.  Evidence of mechanism and evidence 
from RCTs inform each other in important ways.  This is because, used in combination, 
evidence of mechanism and evidence of correlations in populations found in trials can help 
with the weaknesses of each other, as I will now show. Consider the chart below, which 
illustrates the relation between the advantages of each kind of evidence, and the weaknesses 
of the other (updated from Illari 2010): 
Evidence of C-E correlation (such as from clinical studies) 
 Weaknesses: confounding, non-causal correlations, and bias. 
 Advantages: can reveal masking, and can help assess the net effect of a complex 
mechanism. 
Evidence of C-E mechanism (such as from lab or animal studies) 
 Weaknesses: masking, and being too complex to assess a net effect. 
 Advantages: can reveal confounding and non-causal correlations. 
On the one hand, suppose we have identified – even at level 1 – a mechanism explaining the 
link between Drug and Cure, but we are concerned that its action will be masked, either in a 
real human body, or in a real human population.  Then our best evidence that we can put 
aside this concern is evidence of a correlation between treatment with Drug and Cure in a 
real human population, coming from an RCT or other trial.   
On the other hand, if we are concerned that the correlation found in a trial is due to bias or 
confounding by a common cause of treatment and recovery, evidence that the mechanism of 
action of the treatment really works in vitro or in animal studies helps ameliorate that 
concern. 
In these ways, evidence of mechanism, and evidence of correlation in real human 
populations, are both essential in assessing total evidence of whether medical treatments 
really cause cure. 
The intertwining of evidence is important to our assessment of iniparib.  First, we do not 
know why it did not work in the 2014 trial.  The trial report says: “There is not a strong 
biologic hypothesis that can explain the discrepancy in the iniparib efﬁcacy results in the 
ﬁrst- versus second-/third-line cohorts.”  The trial designers could find no difference in 
patient populations, either. (O’Shaughnessy et al. 2014: 3846.)  It is not clear whether the 
mechanism of action of iniparib did not work, or was masked.  An editorial comment 
published at the same time as the 2011 trial illuminates how much we do not know: “We 
cannot tell whether the benefit from the PARP inhibitor accrued to all triple-negative tumors 
equally or whether the benefit preferentially accrued to a subgroup of BRCA-deficient 
tumors, with less effect in those without the deficiency.” (Carey and Sharpless 2011: 278.) 
Specifically, Carey and Sharpless seem to be suggesting that there may be relevant but 
unknown sub-populations in TNBC, and iniparib might work only in a sub-population we 
cannot yet clearly define.  Recall that, to run any clinical study, you have to decide what 
counts as disease, and what counts as cure or desirable outcome.  You have to choose how 
long to run the trial for, and how to measure both disease and outcome.  I claimed above that 
justified decisions on these issues should be based on evidence of the mechanisms of disease 
and of cure. 
To find effective treatments for breast cancer, it is crucial to recognize that there is not one 
homogenous disease ‘breast cancer.’  The classification ‘Triple-Negative Breast Cancer’ is 
already very interesting.  It is a diagnostically important classification because it affects 
prognosis and identifies some treatments as useless.  Yet the classification TBNC depends on 
what we know of the disease mechanisms – and also on known mechanisms of cure.   
Carey and Sharpless are drawing our attention to the fact that sub-populations are likely to be 
central to ongoing development of breast cancer treatments, and hopefully identifying these 
populations will lead to effective treatments for cases which are now classified together 
simply as ‘triple-negative.’  In sum, breast cancer illustrates how evidence of both 
mechanism and of correlation are used in assessing overall evidence of medical treatments.  
As we have seen, the complete mechanism is seldom known, but there are at least three levels 
of evidence of mechanism that may be useful.  We have also discussed the problems of 
masking and of complexity for interpreting evidence of mechanism, and noted that what level 
of evidence of mechanism is needed depends both on what else is known, and the purposes of 
inquiry. 
We have seen throughout this chapter how important evidence of mechanism has been in our 
much improved ability to treat 80-85% of cases of breast cancer, even when ‘gold standard’ 
RCTs are being used.  Well known mechanisms of cancer causation and progression are used 
as a background to design new targeted mechanisms of cure.  In treatments of other diseases, 
the use of such evidence may be far less obvious.  However, in so far as any trial has to 
decide what variables to include, how to measure them, how long to run, and what 
populations the trial results apply to, all trials have to be run based on decisions that the trial 
itself cannot validate alone.  These decisions thus must often be based on evidence of 
mechanisms. 
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